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 ³<RX¶YH-XVW&XUVHG8V´3UHFDULW\$XVWHULW\DQG:RUNHU
Participation in the Nonprofit Social Services (V-révisée recue le 
26 février 2017) 
 
Introduction 
 
Participation, in terms of staff input to policy, work content and program/agency 
development, has been an aspirational, though not always realized, norm in the nonprofit 
sector (Alcock, 2010; Frumkin 2009). The literature identifies these  processes to  include: 1) 
formal participative processes, direct and indirect, embracing forms of joint decision-making 
through collective bargaining, as well as managerially led forms of involvement and 
consultation (Marchington, 1992); and 2)  practice-professional participation which embraces 
task participation ( Baines, 2011: Charlesworth, 2010). 
The nonprofit social services sector (NPSS) in developed countries has experienced 
considerable instability over the last three decades due to the imposition of governance and 
measurement structures associated with the use of New Public Management (NPM). NPM 
has generated purchaser ± provider relations between government and nonprofit agencies 
characterized by competitive tendering, strict adherence to legalistic contracts and 
performance indicators, private-sector business practices, short-term funding and continued 
calls for efficiency, µPRUHIRUOHVV¶value for money and cost savings (Alcock, 2010; Shields 
, 2015; Kimel, 2006). This NPM - generated governance climate led to reduced staff 
numbers, heavy workloads and long hours, as well as extensive unpaid overtime in the sector 
(McMullen and Brisbois, 2003: McMullen and Schellenberg, 2003: Cunningham 2008). In 
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turn, this governance structure has curtailed opportunities for the aforementioned processes of 
participation ( Baines, 2011; Carmel and Harlock, 2008; Kimel 2006). 
The financial crisis of 2008, and its ongoing effects, represent one of a series of 
successive rounds of market-based restructuring and reform that deepened neo-liberalization 
and insecurity for the NPSS. The purpose of this article is to expand knowledge regarding the 
impact of the financial crisis on the NPSS by investigating the extent to which market-
embracing austerity is further undermining workplace participation, both in terms of the level 
of control workers exercise over their day-to-day task as well as their representative security 
in the form of union recognition and other collective forums.  
The article utilizes qualitative data from two Canadian case studies to address this 
issue. The two cases reveal that market-embracing austerity is driving the erosion of 
workplace participation, both in terms of the level of control workers exercise over their day-
to-day task and representative security. The article is divided into four sections. The first 
provides a literature that begins with outlining the impact of austerity in the NPSS sector, 
followed by prospects for employee participation among the Canadian/Ontario NPSS 
organisations in this context, and research questions. The next section outlines the VWXG\¶V
method, followed by the findings, discussion and concluding sections. 
 
Austerity and precarity in the NPSS sector 
 
The 1980s represented the rapid integration of market forces on the provision of public 
services, with the NPSS sector central to this goal (Alcock, 2010; Hickey, 2012). The 
influence of NPM governance was clear as non-profits were placed on a market-based 
footing, delivering services through top-down accountability controls and contractually-
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driven obligations (Carmel and Harlock, 2008). 130KDVEHHQLGHQWLILHGDVDµWUDQVPLVVLRQ
EHOW¶WKURXJKZKLFKwaves of neo-liberal, marketized reforms were passed through to the 
non-profit sector (Shields, , 2015: Cunningham and James, , 2014). Fiscal discipline, 
competitive relations and labour market flexibilization were key aspects of these waves of 
neo-liberalism (Brenner et al, 2010).  
The global financial crisis can be seen as a continuation of successive rounds of such 
market-based restructuring (Clarke and Newman, 2012; Camfield, 2007). Austerity policies, 
understood to be a series of government measures aimed at reducing public expenditures 
(Bach, 2012: Clarke and Newman, 2012), have formed the basis of the latest wave 
(Cunningham and James,  2014). &DQDGD¶VH[SHULHQFHRIWKHJOREDOILQDQFLDOFULVLVDQG
recession differs from that of countries like the UK. Although technically Canada 
experienced only two quarters of mild recession, it is commonly described as having 
undergone more than a year of stagnation and ongoing austerity and slow or no growth. After 
a brief period of economic stimulus, the federal government introduced radical deficit 
reduction strategies and passed these on to the provinces resulting in cuts to social funding, 
wage freezes or roll-backs, and massive public sector job losses. 
Our understanding of the impact of this latest wave of market-led reform on the NPSS 
sector is just beginning. In other similar countries, such as the UK, it manifested in an 
LQWHQVLILFDWLRQRIVRPHRI130¶VPDUNHWYDOXHVLQWKHVKDSHRIincreasing efforts by NPSS 
funders to introduce greater competition (from the private seFWRUµPRUHIRUOHVV¶VWULFWHU
accountability and the continued adoption of private sector management ethos and practices 
(Cunningham and James, 2014). In terms of employment policies, in the UK, these pressures 
have brought further insecurity in income and the degradation of other benefits, greater job 
insecurity and work intensification for NPSS workers (Cunningham and James,  2014).  In 
many ways the NPSS is beginning to exhibit precarity in not only funding, but in 
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organisational and workforce security. If left unchecked, the outcomes of continued 
marketization on employment will include the proliferation of flexible employment contracts, 
the loss of control over working time, deskilling, a blurring of the boundaries between home 
and work, low pay, and the dismantling of occupations (Standing, 2011).  
 
Worker participation in the NPSS 
 
Within this context of post-financial crisis and austerity, and increasing precarious 
employment, little is known about NPSS HPSOR\HHV¶opportunities to continue to participate 
in decision-making. This is a significant gap as participative processes have been found to 
buffer less appealing aspects of working in the NPSS such as poor wages and conditions 
(Nickson et al, 2008).  
With regard to task participation (Marchington, 2005), traditionally, the NPSS 
workforce expected greater participation in decision-making regarding aspects of front-line 
care provision. These participatory processes draw on professional practice and front-line 
knowledge of the job, and permit employees to exercise discretion in terms of prioritising 
tasks, making plans, and developing interventions (Charlesworth, 2010; Eikenberry, 2009). 
This necessarily includes a fair degree of worker control over the pace, timing, intensity and 
content of work (Rubery et al, 2015; Baines, 2011). In doing so, these forms of participation 
potentially provide workers with influence over work organisation and constrain 
manifestations of precarity, such as pressure to be provide more flexibility in working time, 
blurred boundaries between home and work, and the inability to utilise or update existing 
skills. Even prior to the financial crisis, however, managerial ideology under NPM restricted 
task participation through a standardization of work processes and various limits on worker 
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autonomy (Alcock, 2010; Baines, 2004:; Clarke and Newman, 2014; Eikenberry, 2009; 
McDonald and Marston, 2002).  
The second form of participatory process involves joint decision-making through 
collective bargaining, as well as managerially led forms of non-union consultation 
(Marchington, 1992), e.g. joint consultation, team briefings and the management chain. 
Unions provide some protection against precarity as they are an avenue for staff participation 
in setting work processes, levels of wages and conditions and job security. Unions, however, 
have been accused of being too narrow in their outlook, making only meaningless gestures to 
those employed in precarious work (Standing, 2011). NPM, moreover, is seen as inimical to 
collectivism, as its neo-liberal values do not regard trade unions as legitimate partners, but as 
marginal actors defending outmoded forms of service delivery and producer interests (Bach 
and Kessler, 2012). 
The NPSS sector has had a chequered history of embracing unions (Capulong, 2006; 
Kimel, 2006; Peters and Masoka, 2000). It has been seen as a sector with potential for union 
revitalisation (Passey, et al, 2000; Hemmings, 2011). Unions have, however, consistently 
IRXQGLWGLIILFXOWWRRUJDQLVHWKHVHFWRUGXHWRWKHVPDOOVL]HRIPDQ\DJHQFLHVWKHODFNRIµD
IDFWRU\JDWH¶DWwhich to organize dispersed workers; challenges in attributing degradation of 
employment conditions on the employer rather than on external funders; ambivalence among 
the workforce towards unions; and a lack of activists at workplace level (; Hemmings, 2011; 
Simms, 2007). 
Moreover, the relationship between unions and NPSS agencies is often not positive 
(Capulong, 2006; Kimel, 2006). Some NPSS organisations have exhibited unitarist views 
towards unionisation and collective participation (Hemmings, 2011; Simms, 2007) ). 
Unitarism is an American model of human resource management that emphasizes 
management prerogative, and an organisational culture built around a team or family 
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metaphor, where all members share the same (management) goals (Camen-Mueller, 1999; 
&XOOLQDQHDQG'XQGRQ9DQ%XUHQDQG*UHHQZRRG2¶%ULHQDQG0F'RQHOO
2002). Worker participation, under this perspective, is constrained to meeting management 
ends. Conflict is viewed as pathological and a matter of poor communication, deviance or 
mischief. Unions are singled out as unwelcome, a rival source of authority and a risk in terms 
RIXQZDUUDQWHGFRQIOLFW&XOOLQDQHDQG'XQGRQ2¶%ULHQDQG2¶'RQQHOO 
Unitarist values are evident in Canada in union avoidance strategies such as efforts to 
establish non-union forms of worker voice (Taras and Kaufman, 2006) and efforts to keep 
unions out or limit their influence. This can been seen in unfair labour practices such as 
employer discrimination against union activists and organisers, threats of job loss or plant 
closure in the case of union drives and activism, and failing to bargain in good faith (Taras, 
2006). Non-union forms of participation in Canada claim to promote a unity of interest within 
organisations or to complement union structures (Taras and Kaufman, 2006). Many NPSS 
managers share harder unitarist, anti-union views, however. As Kimel (2006) notes, NPSS 
employers resist unionisation, claiming they are a hindrance to mission and service delivery 
because they introduce division and a lack of flexibility in workplaces where otherwise 
everyone would be SDUWRIRQHELJKDSS\³IDPLO\´RU³WHDP´Cunningham, 2000; Capulong, 
2006). In NPSS workplaces where unions do exist, unitarist views can emerge in the 
language and actions of managers during periods of crisis, particularly when there are 
financial problems or the threat of strike action. Management has responded in some cases 
with threats of de-recognition of the union (Cunningham,  2008). 
However, there are exceptions to this rule. In some cases, pre-austerity relations 
between government funders and NPSS agencies provided significant opportunities for 
participation. For example, in terms of task participation, an Australian study shows that 
worker discretion has managed to survive in situations where workers resisted innovation in 
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services that they saw as harmful to service users (Baines, 2011). Moreover, the shared goals 
of social justice and equality mean that unions and more progressive NPSS agencies and 
managers had much in common, and sometimes build forms of social movement unionism 
(Baines, 2010; Kimel, 2006; on social movement unionism, see Camfield, 2007).  
 
The Canadian NPSS sector 
 
As noted earlier, this article explores shifts in PDQDJHPHQW¶VWROHUDQFHIRUIRUPVRI
participation in Ontario, Canada in the current era of austerity. Here, the core non-profit 
sector (excluding charities in the public sector such as hospitals and universities) contributed 
$66.9 billion to the provincial economy (MCI, 2013: 10). Within the OECD, along with The 
Netherlands, the Canadian sector has the highest share of active paid labour force at 11.1% 
(Hall et al, 2005).  More recent estimates in 2012 find the Ontario NPSS employs almost 
three-hundred thousand employees (295,027) (MCI, 2013: 11). Overall, just over a quarter 
(twenty-seven percent) of core non-profit organisations in Ontario are classified as social and 
human service providers. This represents the sub-sector which is the focus of our study. 
These organisations make up fifty-two percent of the seFWRU¶VZRUNIRUFHLQ2QWDULR0LQLVWU\
of Citizenship and Immigration, MCI, 2013: 28, 32). 
Within the NPSS workforce in Ontario there is growing evidence of a reliance on 
precarious labour since the early 2000s: including contract, part-time, casual, on-call 
positions, but also unpaid care work (McMullen and Brisbois, 2003). In the latter case, latest 
figures have identified 274,200 volunteer posts (thirty-one percent of whom are in social and 
human service providers) (MCI, 2013: 43). For many, taking on volunteer posts is a way of 
gaining access into the labour market, rather than an expression of altruism (Mowat Centre, 
2015). The majority of the workers (over eighty percent) are female (Zizys, 2011), and thirty 
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percent of employees are part-time (MCI, 2013: 34). Short-term contract workers make up 
thirty-three percent of the workforce (Mowat Centre, 2015). Other concerns pointing towards 
precarity include an overall sense of lack of employment stability, questions over whether 
NPSS offer a fair income for front-line workers, poor work-life balance and a lack of 
training, career development and retirement benefits (Mowat Centre, 2015). Opportunities for 
representative participation for these workers also appear limited or largely at the prerogative 
of management as figures for NPSS union density in Ontario are low at fourteen percent of 
the workforce: although larger workplaces are more likely to have higher membership 
(Mowat Centre, 2015). This NPSS figure is considerably lower than overall union density in 
Ontario reported as approximately twenty-five percent (Gomez, 2016). 
In the light of the above, this paper addresses the following research questions. Are 
the current wave of austerity policies intensifying pressures on NPSS organisations, if so 
what forms does this take? Are task-based and representative forms of employee participation 
still present in this sector and if so, in what forms and with what effects?  
 
The Study 
 
This qualitative study was undertaken between 2012 ± 14, and involved case studies in two 
large, multi-site, multi-service NPSS agencies in Ontario, Canada. The research design 
required that we seek cases with similarities and differences in order to collect the richest 
possible data (Kirby et al., 2005). The two study cases fit this design as one was not 
unionised (Canadavol1) and one was unionised (Canadavol2). MDQDJHPHQW¶VVKLIWLQJYLHZV
on forms of participation could be evaluated from the onset of austerity to the present in these 
two different contexts. 
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Each case study involved interviews with a range of actors including Chief 
Executive/Senior Directors, senior operational management, Human Resource Managers, 
front line staff (team leaders and workers), and, where available, employee representatives. In 
total there were 34 interviews undertaken, 17 in each agency as outlined in Table 1. In-depth, 
semi-structured interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Participants were 
asked to comment on their pathways and reasons for working and staying in the NPSS sector, 
their current contractual status, career aspirations and changes they had experienced in the 
last few years, their experience of austerity and the impact on their work. In particular, we 
asked respondents to comment on changes to terms and conditions, levels of insecurity, and 
opportunities for expressing their views either at the level of the task, or through collective 
forms of representation. 
Table 1 also reveals that the organisations were large with 120 workers in 
Canadavol1, and 200 in Canadavol2. Canadavol2 was a multi-service provider. Canadavol1 
served immigrants who throughout the remainder of the article are referred to as 
µQHZFRPHUV¶Part-time workers made up approximately thirty percent of the workforce in 
Canadavol1, and it also relied on the services of around 200 volunteers. Though half of its 
workforce was part-time, Canadavol2 had fewer volunteers (50). 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Data analysis took place through a constant comparison method until themes and patterns 
were discerned (Kirby et al, 2005).  
The findings reflect the research questions posed by this study and begin by exploring 
purchaser-provider relations between government and nonprofit agencies, and funding under 
austerity. This is followed by a discussion of some the implications for other aspects of work 
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and employment, such as job security and pay and conditions. The final theme explores 
implications for worker participation in the NPSS.  
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Austerity funding and organisational security 
 
Despite different funding profiles, the global crisis and austerity meant that finances were a 
permanent source of instability for the participating organisations. The influence of NPM 
governance, exacerbated by austerity, was apparent in each case as a tightening funding 
environment existed alongside increased demands from funders for higher levels of service 
provision.  Canadavol1 had a main state funder and several other smaller funders. The 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VPDLQIXQGHUUHTXLUHGLWWRLQFUHDVHWKHQXPEHUVRIFOLHQWVVHHQSHUZRUNHU
from 500-600 per year in 2011/12 to 800 in 2012/13. Funding was explicitly conditional on 
these targets being met. This funding was inadequate, however, in that it failed to cover 
&DQDGDYRO¶VLQIUDVWUXFWXUHPDQDJHPHQWDQG,7FRVWV,QWKH\HDUSULRUWRWKHILHOGZRUNWZR
RIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWIunders, including its main one, cut funding so that projects 
only covered 11 months funding rather than the whole year. 
Canadavol2, in contrast, relied on a complex patchwork of funding sources to 
maintain its programs, services and staff (approximately 40 funding contracts, including 17 
government bodies as well as foundations, service groups, etc.). This type of funding 
arrangement made long-term organisational planning extremely difficult, as management had 
to focus on fund raising on a monthly and yearly basis with contracts ending and starting 
unceasingly. Canadavol2 faced a similar problem of inadequate financial resources and 
support alongside the burden of continual reporting and admin work in the name of 
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accountability and outcome measurement. As with Canadavol1, some funders set unrealistic 
outcome targets for non-profits, creating additional organisational insecurity³,WLVD
SUHFDULRXVVHFWRUDQGZH¶UHUHDOO\LQGDQJHURIEHFRPLQJFKHDSJRYHUQPHQWVHUYLFHVZLWKDOO
the accountability of government and none of WKHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGVWDELOLW\´6HQLRU
Management, female). 
There was evidence in both organisations of the considerable stress placed on the 
individuals responsible for sustaining funding in this difficult environment. One respondent 
subject to multiple funding deadlines reported: 
Meeting all of those funding deadlines, there is a lot of stress and anxiety attached to 
that. When it comes to crunch time, even when you DUHVOHHSLQJ\RX¶UHGUHDPLQJ
DERXWLW,W¶VLQ\RXUVXEFRQVFLRXV,WLVYHU\VWUHVVIXOIHPDOHIURQW-line worker, 
Canadavol1). 
 
Changes to employment conditions 
 
Job security 
 
Austerity funding increased job insecurity in the two case studies. In Canadavol1, over the 
last two years, within the two projects subjected to funding cuts, there had been a significant 
loss of frontline staff. In addition, the remaining employees in these projects received a 
reduction in working hours equivalent to four weHNV¶SD\$IIHFWHGHPSOR\HHVZHUHVXEMHFW
to a two-week layoff, twice per year, with no reduction in workload. 
 
6RZH¶UHODLGRIIWHPSRUDULO\IRUWZRZHHNVLQWKHVXPPHUDQGWZRZHHNVLQWKH
winter and it puts pressure on work-wise because you have to wrap things up and then 
start again (female, front-line worker). 
 
 Management tried to minimize the impact of these unpaid weeks by imposing them 
LQWZRZHHNLQWHUYDOVWRSUHVHUYHZRUNHUV¶EHQHILWVDQGLQRUGHUWRVFKHGXOHWKHPLQWKH
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summer and winter when schools were closed (and when staff were expected to take unpaid 
vacation anyway). However, the two week layoffs made staff ineligible for Employment 
Insurance (though a one month layoff would have provided some benefits) which deepened 
the financial strain on laid-off workers. This manifestation of the impact of austerity cast a 
chill over other workers in the agency at a time of high unemployment who feared further 
layoffs or redundancies.  
,W¶VOLNHDGDUNFORXG\RXGRQ¶WNQRZZKDW¶VJRQQDKDSSHQ:H¶UHNind of living year 
WR\HDUZHFDQ¶WUHDOO\PDNHDQ\UHDOO\ORQJ-term goals or plans to buy things cos we 
GRQ¶WKDYHWKHPRQH\IRULWRUWRVXVWDLQVWDII1RRQH¶VVDIHIURQW-line worker, 
female). 
 
In Canadavol2, the organization sustained its programming and services without 
resorting to staff layoffs by creatively shifting around resources where and when needed. 
Where possible, some part-time staff positions were cobbled together from different funding 
streams in order to add a few more hours to total hours worked. Nevertheless, workers 
identified funding as a major issue with regards to their employment status and job security. 
Many expressed insecurity about the future of their jobs, as they were becoming increasingly 
aware of the precarity of the organization and the entire sector. This insecurity also led to 
increased feelings of stress and made personal/family future planning very difficult. Issues of 
job insecurity were particularly acute for part-time staff.  
 
Pay and conditions 
 
Workers and managers from the case study sites reported problems with pay and conditions. 
Austerity meant that both organisations had suffered a three year wage freeze and salaries had 
fallen behind inflation. Most staff expressed a desire for higher compensation in order to 
VLPSO\³PDNHHQGVPHHW´)URQWOLQHVWDIIIHPDOH, Canadavol2), especially given the high 
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cost of living in the large city where the agencies operated. Understandably, those without 
dependents or with another secure household income felt they were better situated to cope 
with the very modest wages.  
0\KXVEDQGZRUNVDWWKHEDQNVR,KDYHWKDWVHFXULW\ZLWKLQRXUSDUWQHUVKLS«)RU
RWKHUZRUNHUVRUDQ\ERG\HOVHWKDWGRHVQ¶WKDYHWKDWVXSSRUWV\VWem, then definitely I 
NQRZ\RXFDQ¶WUHDOO\SODQ<RXFDQSODQIRUWKHQH[WWKUHH\HDUVEXW\RXFDQ¶Wplan 
for five (Female front-line worker, Canadavol1). 
 
Indeed, this same worker along with several others added that she had delayed having a 
family because of the low wages in the agency.  
Further, some workers were keenly aware that they were paid less than they would be 
if they were doing the same work in the public or private sector (e.g. social workers, home 
care workers, etc.). As a front-line worker observed: 
My rate of pay is low, even compared to other job descriptions of similar basis with 
RWKHURUJDQLVDWLRQV«ZKHQ,¶PDP,VWLOOJRQQDEHPDNLQJD\HDUOLYLQJLQ
FLW\¶VQDPH",W¶VYHU\VWUHVVIXOIRUPHIRUVXUHWRWKLQNWKDW,ORYH my job and I 
probably will always have something to do with not-for-profit and helping people.  
%XWWKHUHDOLW\LVLQFLW\¶VQDPH LVFUDS,W¶VWRXJKWROLYH (Frontline staff, 
male with no dependents, Canadavol2). 
 
Part-timers were worse off in terms of income: exacerbated by agency policies that 
provided much needed benefits only for those who worked over a certain number of hours 
per week (25 hours in Canadavol1 and 24 in Canadavol2). In Canadavol2, precarity in 
income meant many of its part-time Personal Support Assistants had to have multiple jobs in 
order make ends meet. Low wages, insufficient hours and job insecurity, moreover, led to a 
number of these workers contemplating leaving the non-profit sector altogether.  
 
 
,¶YHQRZbeen out of school for a year and I would do anything to have a full time job, 
WRWKHSRLQWZKHUH,ZRXOGOHDYHWKHILHOGWKDW,ZDVLQVFKRROIRUEHFDXVHWKHUH¶V
nothing out there. Especially in non-SURILWVDQG,¶YHVHDUFKHG(Frontline staff, female, 
Canadavol1). 
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Management were very aware of the problems with pay. Within Canadavol1, when 
some money had become available, there had been an attempt to meet Pay Equity obligations 
and allocate wage increases to those at the lower end of the pay scale. Despite this, casual 
employees were still paid just twenty-five cents more than minimum ZDJH7KHDJHQF\¶V
salary scale had also been restructured recently to link pay increases to performance which is 
highly uncommon in the nonprofit sector. Although it was acknowledged, somewhat 
disappointedly, that the three year pay freeze had rendered the performance pay grid moot, it 
seemed to signal the further integration of private-sector practices in a sector where this kind 
of competitive incentive was previously eschewed.  
 
Participation at work  
 
Autonomy and discretion 
 
In Canadavol1 there was evidence that practice-professional/task participation and 
worker autonomy were breaking down under the strain of austerity and NPM. Funders 
increasingly demanded every dollar be accounted for and measured against performance. 
Workers seemed increasingly trapped within the draconian, intensified targets introduced by 
the funding bodies and enforced, sometimes reluctantly, by management. Work content and 
processes were dominated by outputs (numbers of clients seen by the agency) rather than 
particular care or service outcomes. Management and workers reported that documenting, 
reporting and monitoring these targets took an average of thirty percent of their working time. 
In turn, increased targets, oversight and bureaucracy eroded the degree to which workers 
exercised control over how services were delivered, the ordering and pacing of their work 
tasks, and the quality of their work.  
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Management in Canadavol1 compelled workers into taking on highly pressurised 
roles through a number of means. Part-time employees, for instance, faced trying to 
accomplish the high workload and increasingly stringent monitoring requirements from 
management. 
The trend in non-profit work is when there are the three days a week half time 
positions, UHDOO\\RX¶UHGRLQJIXOOWLPH<RX¶UHWRWDOO\GRLQJDIXOO-WLPHMREWKHUH¶V
just no resources (Female, front-line worker). 
 
Many of the workers came from the newcomer communities the agency serviced. 
Coupled with the difficult external economic and labour market climate, this meant that 
workers, many of whom were permanent residents though not full citizens, felt vulnerable 
and were grateful for even part-time employment and short-term contracts. Extended 
probationary periods and the use of fixed term contracts were also explicitly used by 
management to weed out those not meeting expectations. The organisation also had a pool of 
volunteers. Most of the volunteers were newcomers and many had been service users, whose 
next step into employment could be part-time posts at the agency itself. The existence of 
reserve pools of labour, so readily available to management, added to workers sense that they 
could not refuse the mounting volume of work or protest poor conditions.  
Work intensification also occurred through instances where staff felt they had to use 
their own personal time to complete tasks. Despite some staff reporting a degree of flexibility 
from their employer when having to go to personal appointments, the majority indicated lack 
of control and discretion over working time and general work ± life balance. Canadavol1 
operated a time off in lieu system as overtime was not paid, but many respondents found 
themselves working considerably more hours than they were contracted for. 
I have young children, so after they go to bed and I take a nap with them, I wake at 
ten and usually then work from 10.00pm until 2.00am\RXFDQ¶WVXVWDLQLWVR,¶P
having problems right now (female, front-line worker, Canadavol1). 
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Most workers reported that they were unable to take time off in lieu in order to meet 
targets and deadlines, and to position themselves better for employment opportunities in the 
future.  The lack of control and uncertainty over working time was more pronounced for part-
time workers. In Canadavol2, for instance, hours for Personal Support Workers were never 
guaranteed and could change from week to week, or even day to day, creating scheduling 
problems for workers. Often Personal Support Workers in Canadavol2 were required to work 
sometimes six or seven days a week.  
Other sources of intensification occurred in Canadavol1 and were related to 
³YROXQWHHULQJ´WRKHOSZLWKODUJHUDJHQF\HYHQWVDQGIXQGUDLVLQJ:LWKUHJDUGWRWKHODWWHU
respondents reported that rather than an option chosen as part of their desire to go the extra 
mile for the service user and organiVDWLRQ³YROXQWHHULQJ´KDGEHFRPHDQexplicit 
management expectation. Those who did not demonstrate the required availability were 
punished by management in the form of insufficient hours, or longer or permanent lay-off. 
For front-line respondents, therefore, working additional time and volunteering was less 
about donating labour freely for the cause, but more about just keeping their jobs. 
 
Representative participation 
 
Despite the above, when workers needed the security of representation at work, the prospects 
for union action were slim or under threat in our study sites. Austerity measures to cut 
services, achieve efficiencies, reduce jobs and terms and conditions provided an incentive for 
management to undermine or challenge the legitimacy of forms of representative voice that 
might challenge these measures.  
Canadavol1 was non-union and managers voiced strong suspicion and antagonism 
toward collective bargaining. The unitarist values underpinning WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDSSURDFK
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WRHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVZDVRQHWKDWFRQWDLQHGHIIRUWVWREXLOGWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHGµXQLW\RI
LQWHUHVW¶7DUDVDQG.DXIPDQ0DQDJHPHQWUHSRUWHG the organisation possessed a 
transparent, caring µWHDP¶µIDPLO\¶and open style of dealing with employment relations. 
Canadavol1 had established what was described as DQµRSHQGRRU¶SROLF\Rf handling 
grievances and communication with individual workers. The management chain served as the 
mechanism of representation for employees, with line managers believing they acted as a 
filter for any problems. In addition, individuals could speak directly to the Chief Executive if 
a matter was serious enough to require it. This µRSHQ-GRRU¶ policy existed alongside a system 
of team meetings, employee engagement surveys, and a government-mandated joint health 
and safety committee.  
 
,OLNHWRWKLQNWKDWZH¶YHFUHDWHGDFXOWXUHZKHUHZH¶UHDFFHVVLEOHDQG
UHVSRQVLYH«ZHWU\DQGEHVRPHZKDWWUDQVSDUHQWDQGZHWU\WREHDVVXSSRUWLYHDVZH
can (HR Manager). 
 
Austerity and the impact of NPM measures was, however, leading to a hardening of 
PDQDJHPHQWV¶views VWDUWLQJZLWKDQXQGHUPLQLQJRIWKHDERYHHIIRUWWRGHYHORSDµunity of 
interest¶. The health and safety committee was reported as becoming increasingly ineffective. 
in recent years. One worker who was a member of the committee reported how management 
were reluctant to accept employee views during meetings even when there were relatively 
innovative suggestions being raised.  
 
No matter how much innoYDWLYHWKLQNLQJWKH\PDQDJHPHQWVD\µ1R¶IURQW-line 
worker, female). 
 
In addition, the use of the management chain to facilitate workforce participation was 
undermined as managers reportedly became intolerant of individual worker grievances about 
workload demands, arguing additional responsibilities could and should be managed 
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effectively and individually by employees. Failure to do so was thought to be the result of 
individual shortcomings and not a reflection on management or the externally imposed 
workload.  
Managers further reinforced this by modelling unsustainable work practices, often 
communicating that they worked throughout the night, whilst sick and on holiday, embracing 
self-sacrifice and overwork as a way to sustain and prove commitment to the agency. This 
culture transferred into the work practices of front-line employees. One worker illustrated 
KRZWKLVPHDQWWKHUHZDVDFXOWXUHRIEHLQJµVFDUHGWRJRVLFN¶EHFDXVHRIWKHFXOWXUHRIVHOI-
sacrifice. 
 
:KHQ\RX¶UHVLFN\RXJRµ2KP\*RG¶you have rights to so many sick days, but 
WKHQ\RXGRQ¶WJHWWKHFKDQFHWRWDNHLW«To be honest with you, I wish I could have 
actually called in sick to day cost my neck and everything is killing, but then I have a 
meeting with our librarian, we have to change one of our programme spaces (front-
line worker, female). 
 
 
Moreover, any suggestions of union intervention were met with hostile unitarist 
rhetoric. Management pronounced that deep discord between themselves and staff would be 
introduced if unions were involved, particularly in situations where the agency was 
compelled to restructure or lay off workers. These unitarist values included claiming that 
unions: were trouble-makers who disrupt the team and family culture of an organisation; 
EULQJDQµXVDQGWKHP¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKVWDIIGHQLJUDWHPDQDJHPHQW¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR
improving working conditions; reduce opportunities to gain flexibility from the workforce; 
and disrupt services and are therefore harmful to clients. When the HR manager was asked 
aboXWXQLRQLVDWLRQVKHUHWRUWHG³<RXQRZKDYHWRJRRXWVLGHWXUQDURXQGWKUHHWLPHVDQG
FRPHEDFNLQFRV\RX¶YHMXVWFXUVHGXV´6HQLRUPDQDJHPHQWIHPDOHAnother senior 
manager added: 
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+RQHVWO\XQLRQV,GRQ¶WWKLQNDUHUHDOO\ZKHUHZHZDQWWRJR«It would cause 
SUREOHPVIRUXVLIZHXQLRQLVHG:H¶GORVHDORWRIRXUEHQHILWVZH¶GORVHDORWRIRXU
PRUDOH,WKLQN«,WKLQNXQLRQVPDNHDORWRIGLVFRQWHQWZLWKLQPDQDJHPHQWDQGVWDII
LWVHOI«ZHZRUNZHOOWRJHWKHU<RXSXWDXQLRQLQWKDW,VHHDORWRIGLIIerent alliances 
developing. 
 
Some employees shared managemenWV¶QHJDWLYHRSLQLRQVRIXQLRQV. 
,ZRUNHGEHIRUHLQDXQLRQL]HGRUJDQL]DWLRQDQG,GLGQ¶WVHHELJEHQHILWV,NQRZWKHUH
is a benefit, but also there is the union deduction. You have to pay and LW¶VQRWDVPDOO
amount. I think we are okay (front-line worker, female) 
 
This position was not uniform across staff and many felt poorly represented within the 
agency. For example, the staff on the mandatory two-week layoff felt angry at WKHµWDNHLWRU
lHDYHLW¶DSSURDFK management exhibited and the lack of real consultation on this strategy. 
These staff argued that more consultation and negotiation would improve things.  
In addition, some interviewees expressed frustration that managers took extended 
leave over and above that given to employees and when they returned, in order to catch up 
they seemed to increase demands on their subordinates. Others observed that management 
was rarely affected by layoffs or pay reductions while staff almost always were. Several staff 
contrasted their experience with the practice of a sister, unionized agency where management 
had engaged in close consultation with the staff about how to implement temporary layoffs 
and save jobs. There was also a group of workers who had come from countries where 
unionisation was much stronger and felt that efforts should be made to organise. However, 
we were told that the last effort to unionise had ended abruptly when the staff member 
leading the drive was suddenly and permanently laid off.  
Overall, management appeared in the ascendency at the time of the research (2013). 
The increasing unitarist trope and anti-collectivism IDYRXUHGE\&DQDGDYRO¶VPDQDJHPHQW
was also evident in its desire to move toward a performance pay system. There were also 
numerous reports that management was building a culture of fear where it was not safe to 
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express opinions openly or to be critical of management decisions. Some staff perceived that 
anyone not well-liked by management was unlikely to retain employment at the agency. 
There were fears of reprisals should staff be unwilling to work additional hours, display 
weakness or otherwise underperform. 
Canadavol2 presented a different climate characterised by emerging unitarism, rather 
than the intensifying hostility towards collective bargaining and other forms of representative 
participation seen at Canadavol1. Canadavol2 had a long history of peaceful industrial 
relations and a participatory approach to collective bargaining. Management had, in the past, 
been supportive of worker demands for better conditions and even jointly campaigned in this 
regard.  
,QGXVWULDOUHODWLRQVFKDQJHGRQFHDXVWHULW\EHJDQWRLPSDFWRQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
financial stability. Matters came to a head in the agency when the union tabled a claim for a 
pay rise to end the three year wage freeze and the inclusion of part-time staff in the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VEHQHILWVVFKHPH. Workers believed that management would honor traditional 
participatory processes and agree to most of their bargaining demands. Management did not 
agree, however, and instead proposed a continued wage freeze, the reduction in benefits for 
full-time staff and no improvement for part-timers. Protracted negotiations broke down, and 
workers ended up on a ten day strike: thHILUVWLQWKHDJHQF\¶VKLVWRU\.  
Some workers wondered whether the strike was the beginning of what might be a 
heightened union struggle in a sector increasingly under duress,  
A lot of agencies in this sector have VKLIWHG7KH\¶UHDUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHILQDQFLDO
climate, it is a non-SURILWDJHQF\EXWLW¶VVWLOODIIHFWHGE\ZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJLQWKH
VHFWRU«LW¶VDOVRWKHSROLWLFDOFOLPDWHDQGULJKWQRZODERXULVLPPRELOLVHG,IWKH\VHH
the union as strong, they would change their position at the bargaining table. 
(Frontline staff, male) 
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Despite their previously more progressive outlook, senior managers revealed an 
emerging unitarist approach to unions and collective mobilisation that involved a reassertion 
RI³PDQDJHPHQWULJKWV´6HQLRUPDQDJHPHQWIHPDOHand the notion that they alone should 
run the workplace. Front-line staff, in turn, confirmed that management had recently changed 
its approach to participation and power sharing, particularly during bargaining. As a senior 
worker and co-SUHVLGHQWRIWKHXQLRQREVHUYHG³WKHUHVHHPHGWREHOHVVZLOOLQJQHVVWRVKDUH
DQ\SRZHU´accompanied by efforts to narrow the scope of collective bargaining (Frontline 
supervisor, female).  
We (management and the union) had agreed on a process at the beginning of how 
WKLQJVZRXOGZRUNDQGWKHQWKHPDQDJHPHQWODZ\HUFDPHLQDQGVDLG³7KHVHDUH
the things we refuVHWRWDONDERXWDQ\PRUHDQGWKHVHDUHWKHWKLQJVWKDWZH¶OOVWLOOWDON
DERXW:KLFKZDVQRWWKHSURFHVV6RWKHXQLRQFRQWLQXHGWRVD\³:HOOZH¶UHMXVW
GHDOLQJZLWKHYHU\WKLQJLQWKHZD\WKDWZHDJUHHGWRDWWKHEHJLQQLQJ´)URQWOLQH
supervisor, female) 
 
Other unitarist attitudes overlapped with this reassertion of managerial dominance. 
For example, senior management continuously reported that the staff did not understand that 
voting affirmatively for the strike vote meant that they may end up on strike. Highlighting 
this presumed naïveté, a manager who had been on the bargaining team told us that her staff 
YRWHG\HVRQWKHVWULNHEDOORW³1RWUHDOLVLQJZKHQ\RXYRWHG\RXJDYHSHUPLVVLRQIRUWKDW
bargaining team to make those decisions on your behalI´6HQLRUPDQDJHPHQWIHPDOH7KLV
quote reflects strong unitarist strands, by portraying workers as easily duped by aggressive 
and divisive unions.   
Management and workers identified external collective bargaining parties as 
contributing to a more adversarial and confrontational tone during contract negotiations ± 
VSHFLILFDOO\WKHXQLRQ¶VQDWLRQDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHDQGWKHPDQDJHPHQWWHDP¶VODZ\HU
Repeating a sentiment present in all management interviews, one of the senior managers 
identified the source RIFRQIOLFWHGZRUNSODFHUHODWLRQVDVWKHQDWLRQDOXQLRQµ,WKLQNLWZDV
22 
 
(the) national union. I think it was their tactics more than the staff, and I think that they 
wanted to make an example of us¶ (Senior Management, female).  
In contrast, most staff blamed the lawyer management hired from a high profile anti-
union law firm that had often been in the news in direct conflict with public and nonprofit 
ZRUNHUV(PSOR\HHVDOVRH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQWKDWWKHUHODWLYHO\QHZPDNHXSRIWKHDJHQF\¶V
Board (from the business community) represented an ideological shift to the right in the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VOHDGHUVKLSand likely contributed to the decision to bring in the 
aforementioned lawyer. A manager agreed with this employee perspective by stating ³The 
board now is FRQVLGHUDEO\,WKLQNPRUHFRQVHUYDWLYHWKDQPDQDJHPHQWLV´)URQWOLQH
supervisor, male). 
The ten day strike was a pivotal moment for almost everyone interviewed as it 
highlighted the long term and growing financial precarity of the sector.  While there was a 
strong mandate and support for a strike by workers, it had mixed consequences for workforce 
morale and perceptions of the value of collective action. Some felt that the strike brought 
workers closer together - - ³One of the best parts of walking the line was you could actually 
KDYHWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQVDERXWVWUXFWXUDOLVVXHVLQDZD\WKDWZHFDQ¶WGRGXULQJZRUN´
(Frontline staff, female). Similarly, as a mid-level coordinator noted, in reference to her staff, 
³PRVWRIWKHPZHUHLQFUHGLEO\VXSSRUWLYHRIthe union. There was definitely no breaking of 
UDQNVWKHUH´)URQWOLQHVXSHUYLVRUIHPDOH 
There were emerging problems with morale, however. Many workers expressed 
surprise that management was willing to escalate the dispute. Some workers as a result 
³GLGQ¶WZDQWWRGHDOZLWKPDQDJHPHQW´)URQWOLQHVWDIIPDOH, feeling let down, and rejected 
organisational efforts to re-engage with them. Some were unhappy with what the union had 
gained from their sacrifices while being on strike. Moreover, the dispute led to increased 
feelings of job insecurity, as staff members realized that agency funding and the overall 
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organizational financial situation had become far more precarious. As one research 
SDUWLFLSDQWQRWHG³I think part of it was that nobody really knew what a precarious position 
we were in  -- WKDWZDVSDUWRIZKDWXSVHWSHRSOHDQGWKDW¶VSDUWO\ZK\WKH\¶UHQRZIHHOLQJ
PD\EHP\MRELVQ¶WVHFXUH$QGLILW¶VEDGQRZLVLWJRLQJWRJHWZRUVH"´)URQWOLQHVWDII
female). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This article has sought to investigate the extent to which market-embracing austerity is 
further undermining workplace participation in NPSS organisations. The study reveals that 
each organisation faced intensified funding precarity and subsequent familiar NPM-based 
demands of value for money, greater performance and volumes of work. Employees 
subsequently experienced changes in working conditions and status in both agencies that 
increasingly resembled those RIµSUHFDULRXVZRUNHUV¶(Standing, 2011).  
In terms of the implications for worker participation in the climate of austerity, the 
data reveal that task and representative forms of participation have either been eroded or have 
had their legitimacy challenged by management. Task participation in the organisations has 
also been eroded in the face of the NPM-inspired requirements of monitoring, 
standardization, bureaucracy and calls for value for money, efficiency and cost savings. 
Choice and discretion for workers and volunteers can also be seen to have diminished and 
previously voluntary, freely-donated unpaid labour was increasingly compulsory. Workers, 
moreover, appeared to be losing their capacity to exert discretion over working time, content 
and pace, and to strike a reasonable work ±life balance. 
 Although the two organisations had very different perspectives on the value of 
representative participation, there was a commonality in the direction taken by management 
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under austerity. Specifically, each organisation questioned the legitimacy of existing forums 
of representative participation. In Canadavol1, representation structures built around the 
management chain and an µRSHQ-GRRU¶SROLF\WRIRVWHUWKHµXQLW\RISXUSRVH¶ZHUHEHLQJ 
degraded, alongside increasingly vociferous anti-union rhetoric. In response, workers 
employed some individual forms of resistance through quitting, but fear of reprisals and a 
lack of union-based representative security significantly constrained worker actions. 
In Canadavol2, previously stable, participative industrial relations processes were 
significantly eroded. Instead, an increasingly hostile unitarist rhetoric emerged, stressing 
management prerogative and citing unions as mischievous, disruptive, and duping workers 
into unnecessary conflict. Yet, here, collective organisation and resistance remained a central 
outlet for employee discontent, and led to some positive outcomes in terms of attachment to 
the union.  
It is difficult to generalise the results of the two cases to the entire Canadian NPSS 
and beyond. The cases are useful, however, for a number of reasons. They confirm the 
continuing erosion of task-based participation through a standardization of work processes, 
and restrictions on worker autonomy (Alcock, 2010; Clarke and Newman, 2014; Eikenberry, 
2009). This study also confirms WKHFHQWUDOLW\RIWKHPDQDJHPHQW¶VFRQWURORIZRUNLQJWLPH
in securing greater control over employees in the context of austerity policies. Further 
research needs to be undertaken to ascertain whether this particular wave of neo-liberal 
reforms is further squeezing workers¶ previously reported ability to resist .  
The cases not only confirm that the current wave of NPM-driven public service 
workplace reforms breeds anti-union sentiments in management and some staff (Bach and 
Kessler, 2012), but they further raise questions concerning whether this context is hostile to 
all forms of representative participation, even those built on µXQLW\RILQWHUHVW¶7DUDV
This question is relevant to all public services, even those directly provided by the state. For 
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here, unions have attempted to varying degrees to accommodate public service reforms that 
contain NPM elements through partnership agreements (Bach and Kessler, 2012). During 
austerity, these efforts may turn out to be merely tools for management to incorporate 
workers and their representatives into agreeing to their own work intensification and loss of 
influence. 
The cases raise further questions concerning whether the type of union engagement 
and conflict evident in Canadavol2 is sustainable, or whether the demise of non-union forums 
in Canadavol1 could lead to unions stepping in to the representational void. It is clear that 
Canadavol2¶Vunion efforts regarding benefits for the precarious workforce was more than 
PHUHO\µJHVWXUHV¶6WDQGLQJ and workers engaged positively with the strike. In 
addition, even in the non-union setting of Canadavol1, some employees saw the value of 
unionisation. Perceptions of insecurity were on the rise in both case studies and ambivalence 
or hostility to unionism was apparent. In many ways, management appeared to be building 
regimes built on fear and leaving questions as to whether representative participation has a 
future in the NPSS sector. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Workplace participation has been a central aspirational aspect among workers and more 
progressive management in parts of the NPSS sector (Frumkin, 2005), and has been found to 
buffer less appealing aspects such as poor wages and conditions (Nickson et al, 2008). This 
article revealed that market-embracing austerity is undermining workplace participation in 
NPSS organisations, both in terms of the day-to-day task and representative security. 
Coercive, ³PDQDJHPHQWNQRZVEHVW´XQLWDULVPDUHFRQVHTXHQFHVof the further integration of 
market-rule austerity into the everyday lives of those working in the NPSS. The article raises 
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questions concerning how sustainable forms of participation are in the NPSS, and in public 
service organisations generally, in an era of increasing worker precarity and management 
hostility. 
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Table 1: Profile of organisations and interview respondents 
 Canadavol1 Canadavol2 
Services Advisory services to 
newcomers 
Multi-service provider ± 
homeless, substance abuse, 
newcomers 
Senior managers 3 4 
Frontline managers 3 3 
Front-line staff 11 8 
Trade union representatives - 2 
Overall workforce numbers 120 200 
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